This paper aims to provide insights into human perception, navigation performance and confidence in helicopter overland navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is a challenging mission area because it is a complex cognitive task, and failing to recognize when the aircraft is off-course can lead to operational failures and mishaps. A human-in-the-loop experiment to investigate pilot misperception during simulated overland navigation by analyzing actual navigation trajectory, pilots' perceived location, and corresponding confidence levels was designed. Fifteen military officers with prior overland navigation experience completed four simulated low-level navigation routes, two of which entailed auto-navigation. Analysis shows that there is no correlation between perceived and actual location of the aircraft, nor between confidence level and actual location. There is however some evidence that there is a negative correlation between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias towards that intended flight route. If aviation personnel can proactively identify the circumstances in which usual misperception occur in navigation, they may reduce mission failure and mishap rate. Fleet squadrons and instructional commands can benefit from this study to improve operations that require low-level flight while also improving crew resource management.
Nomenclature

AGL
= above ground level GPS = global positioning system NM = nautical miles OTW = out-the-window PAC = pilot-at-control PNAC = pilot-not-at-control RMS = root-mean-square SDT = signal detection theory TERF = terrain flight TFH = total flight hours VFR = visual flight rules
I. Introduction
elicopter overland navigation is a necessary but challenging mission area that is also a complex cognitive task. Low-level navigation, or "terrain flight" (TERF), is defined as overland flight below 200 feet above ground level (AGL) 1 . This environment is challenging because the low flight level reduces the amount of terrain that the pilot can see, and requires intense emphasis on flight parameters while simultaneously shortening reaction time to flight obstacles. Helicopter overland navigation is comprised of a number of sub-skills that require continuous visual cue perception and decision making. "Pilot Not At the Controls" (PNAC) is primarily responsible for accurate navigation and he must remain oriented at all times, monitor cockpit instruments, and perform assigned cockpit duties as briefed. During an emergency, he executes the emergency procedures as briefed by the pilot" 1 . The navigational task can be done by visual navigation, dead reckoning, or electronic navigation using Global Positioning System (GPS), or some other system such as radio aids to Navigation (NAVAIDs). Visual navigation is performed by comparing terrain features on a map to what is seen out the window of the aircraft. Dead reckoning involves taking a known position inferring location by using direction and timing. Advances in GPS technology have decreased the use of visual navigation and dead reckoning, yet GPS technology is restricted in many aircraft by regulation 2 to a backup form of navigation. The PNAC may use all three forms of navigation, separately or in combination, in order to accurately navigate through low-level terrain; genrally the various methods of naviation are cross-checked against each other to give the pilots high confidence in their posisiton. On top of this heavy navigational workload, the PNAC's most important role is to assist the Pilot At the Controls (PAC) in obstacle avoidance. Because of the complex cognitive task placed on the nonflying aviator, it is easy to deviate from course. Straying off course is not an issue if the aviator is aware of being off course. However, often the aviator is unaware of being off course.
We focused on the navigation aspect of terrain flight; our simulated aircraft was held at constant altitude and did not experience emergencies -two critical dimensions of real-world TERF navigation. "Proficient navigation during low-level flight requires training and practice. Identifying check points (CPs) is the critical task, since this requires the navigator to be proficient in map reading, terrain interpretation, and correlation of terrain features with map symbols. He must be able to visualize from the map how the terrain along the flight path should look. He must also be able to look at the terrain, identify his location, and locate it on the map" 1 . Low-level VFR Navigation requires efficient visual scanning. Visual scanning is the ability to recognize and reference key terrain features in a given field of view. These key terrain features will allow the navigator to recognize waypoints and intermediate check points along the route. Pilots must also "be prepared for the terrain to look differently than as planned and adjust as necessary" 1 . This statement is especially true at night where shading and culutual lighting may make the terrain appear different than expected.
Misperception can lead to both mission failure by the aircraft not reaching its intended destination on time, and also mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the terrain. The Navy Safety Center has adopted James Reason's "Swiss cheese" model for understanding the underlying process that results in mishaps 3 . The Swiss cheese model relates a system to a stack of slices of Swiss cheese. Each slice of cheese is a layer of the system, and the holes are analogous to opportunities for the system to fail. Mishaps occur only when the holes line up allowing failures to pass through without being stopped by another system. This research focuses on the slice that relates to pilot judgment. A recent mishap involving a senior pilot and aircrew flying a MH-60S under daytime clear atmospheric conditions illustrates the reason for our research. The senior pilot had a vast knowledge of the area, but decided to not follow course rules back to their home station. They hit power lines and crashed the helicopter. This mishap was due to overconfidence in the pilot on where they perceived they were flying. The pilot's confidence contributed to the complacency of the co-pilot and aircrew. Luckily, no one was killed, but it did highlight the fact that misperception can have drastic consequences.
II. Pilot misperception and confidence during helicopter overland naviation
Ref. 4 presents a matrix derived from signal detection theory (SDT) showing the four different awareness states of a navigating pilot 4 . The most concerning area is marked "Dangerous", where the crew believes that they are on course when they are not. This type of misperception can lead to both mission failure by the aircraft not reaching its intended destination on time and also mishaps due to the pilot flying into obstacles in the terrain. In Ref. 5 , navigation and eye scan pattern data were collected from 12 military officers who underwent an overland navigation simulation. This experiment had pilots navigate through 12 waypoints in a simulation terrain model of Twentynine Palms, CA. Regression anlaysis showed flight performance measures such as RMS (rootmean square) error were not predicted by the expertise level of pilots. However, gaze parameters and scan management skills were predicted by the expertise level. Most relevant to this study, analysis through Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool (FEST, Fig. 1a ) showed that some pilots had biased perception. As shown in Fig. 1b , subject 5 missed a waypoint and started to track north of the intended route 6 . The subject missed waypoint 6 and took a left turn into this valley (6') as shown in Fig. 1b . Then, he flew north of the intended trajectory (7' and 8'), believing he was on waypoints 7 and 8. Initially planned waypoints are shown in black whereas the subject's estimation is shown in blue. On his way from waypoint 6' to 7', he saw a valley on the right side of the flight heading direction in the OTW scene. If he had been on track (i.e., between 6 and 7), he would have been surrounded by hills and should not have been able to see any saddle or valley and his heading would have been much different. Even though his gaze data showed that he scanned the valley, the pilot did not question his orientation. Instead of using available visual cues on the flight simulation screen or out-the-window (OTW) to realize that he was off course, he perceived that he was still on course. This pattern suggests the pilot was using some biased visual cueing in which he overweighed OTW cues that fit into his perception that he was on course, and disregarded OTW cues that did not fit with his hypothesis.
Not only did the subject show misperception, but also a strong confidence at the same time. When the subject redirected whenever they were off-track about 1 km away from the intended route following the experiment protocol, s/he was very reluctant to follow the experimenter's redirection expressing a strong confidence believing that s/he was on-track. These somewhat unexpected phenomenona has been observed on several pilots during the experiment and we started to question whether one's confidence is indeed correlated to their navigation performance or not, or that one's confidence may even increase with greater navigation errors. If a participant perceived themselves to be "lost," they would be able to recognize that fact and therefore have a corresponding low confidence level. Next, we noted that subjects' bias did not seem arbitrary, rather it showed a pattern or consistency. The bias was toward the planned route trajectory. Connecting with their observed high confidence, we started to question whether pilots' high confidence is related to this bias toward the intended route rather than their actual current location. This paper proposes to support these experimental observations, which is contrary to a common belief that confidence is a good indicator of good performance 7 , through human-in-the-loop experiments. The goal of the experiment was to place a participant with navigation experience in a situation where only visual terrain cues were available for navigating. To test our notions about perception, performance, and confidence, we test several hypotheses, listed below: Hypothesis 1: There is a negative correlation between confidence and distance from participant's perceived location and actual helicopter position. Hypothesis 2: There is a negative correlation between confidence and distance from participant's perceived location and the intended route of flight. Hypothesis 3: The longer a participant navigates through an intended route, the greater the distance between the perceived location and the actual helicopter position. 
III. Methods: Simulator-Based Human-in-the-Loop Experiments
A. Paricipants
There were a total of 15 participants ranging from 27 to 41 years of age, with an average of 36 years with a standard deviation of 4.8. Total flight hours (TFH) ranged from 0 to 2,500 with an average of 1,431 and a standard deviation of 803.5. Total overland hours ranged from 0 to 2,000 with an average of 870 and a standard deviation of 634.2 hours. There were eleven U.S. Navy, four U.S. Army participants, and one Hellenic Air Force participant. To participate in this experiment the participant needed to have overland navigation training. Participants for this study were recruited from the Naval Postgraduate School student body and faculty. Recruitment was completed through an IRB approved e-mail sent to Operations Research Department and Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation (MOVES) students.
B. Equipment
The software used to run the simulation was Image Generator, Terrain & Map D8, Data Logger by Delta3D and OpenSceneGraph. These programs used inputs through X-Plane 9.21rc2, a commercially used flight simulator. The software converts the X-Plane data into the OTW and map views based on the participants inputs. A 43" by 24" screen was used to present the OTW view and 33" by 33" disply for the map and cockpit view. The X-Plane and the Image Generator were set with a modernized autopilot flying at 150 ft AGL at 65 knots. This altitude remained fixed throughout the route and maintained obstacle clearance in the mountainous terrain. Moving the joystick up and down did not affect the pitch of the aircraft, but did allow the participant to look up and down. The roll of the aircraft was completed with left or right joystick inputs. This put the aircraft in coordinated turns. The software also updated the instruments to correspond with the current flight profile.
Confidence App Software was created in order gain useful confidence output data. This program allowed the participant to click where they perceived themselves to be on the map display. After the participant right-clicked on the map, a red dot showed on the screen and a confidence scroll bar appeared. This confidence bar allowed the participant to rate how confident they were of their perceived location. This bar ranged from 100, very confident, to 0, very lost. After the route was complete, the software also created a text file that contained the elapsed time of when the participant made his location estimate, the actual helicopter latitude and longitude, the participant's estimated latitude and longitude, and the participant's confidence on their perceived location. 
C. Visual navigation task
The route needed to be in a location that did not favor any particular pilot's previous fleet experience and covered an area that had challenging terrain so that there was great possibility of misperceiving the surroundings. Finally, it needed to be an area adequately mapped in FALCONVIEW to use in our analysis. The mountainous area of Twentynine Palms was selected for this experiment for several reasons. The first was that the area includes some landmarks, and there are multitudes of executable routes. Secondly, most of the participants of the study had not operated in this area. Finally, we consider the high altitude desert terrain to be comparable to the current operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
After choosing the operating area, routes were selected to support hypothesis testing. To collect sufficient data, four routes were generated, along with a practice route. The participant had to navigate through the route using a joystick which controlled heading (roll) only; participants had no control over yaw, power, or airspeed. Participants were able to control pitch, but the simulator was set up such that pitch changes did not have accompanying altitude and airspeed changes. The pilots did not have to control attitude, airspeed, rotor speed or turn coordination (commonly referred to as "ball", due to the setup of the turn-and-slip indicator in real aircraft), therefore greatly simplifying the navigational task. For the last two routes, a scripted "autopilot" guided the participant along a set course without their control.
The auto-navigation routes were added to normalize the experiment in the following manner: If all of the participants were able to control the helicopter through the routes, each pilot would see different terrain features because the probability of two independent pilots flying the same course is practically zero. Controlling the route with the autopilot allowed the experiment proctor to pause the route at the exact same points, so that each participant sees the same terrain. More than this, it ensures that each pilot is presented the terrain identically -that they approach it from the same azimuth and roll angle. Appendix includes all four routes designed in this study.
With the number and types of routes chosen, the waypoints comprising the route were selected. The routes needed to be fair, yet challenging enough for the pilots to get off-course. We subjectively created routes that were appropriate for a late-first tour aviator's level of experience, approximately 750-1000 total hours. The practice route was designed to get the participant familiar with the control of the helicopter, feel comfortable using the confidence program, establish a scan pattern, and gain familiarity with the interfaces. The practice route was a short, fourwaypoint route. This route was based off prominent landmarks, yet still required the pilot to make large heading changes.
D. Procedure
Participants were introduced to the experimentation lab with an IRB approved welcome script that notified the participant of the focus of the study, brief overview of what will be expected out of them, rules of the lab, and the voluntary nature of the study. The participants were given an informed consent form to read and sign. The form reviewed the minimal risks, the voluntary nature, the benefits, and confidentiality of participating in this experiment. After the informed consent, the participant was given a questionnaire relating to their flying experience and background. The background questionnaire included basic demographics, familiarity of the simulation-operating environment, experience with overland navigation, flight hours, and time since last flight. This data was collected to help group the participants for analysis.
Once the participant completed the background questionnaire, they were given a familiarization to the experiment; including the flight parameters of the helicopter, what was contained on the video screens, joystick control, and how to use the confidence feature of the simulation. Once the participant seemed comfortable with how the simulation would run, they were given a map of the practice route. This was an 8x11 map printed from Falconview. The map was a 1:50K TLM, just like the one that they would see on the monitor. This map was annotated, or "doghoused", with the waypoint number, distance in NM, time to fly the leg at 60 knots, and total elapsed time. This paper map was only allowed during the map study, and not during the flight portion of the simulation. The participant could only use the map on the monitor, which included numbered waypoints, during the simulation. The participant were given unlimited time to review the practice map before flying the simulation. The practice simulation was four waypoints long on an easy route. One of the main objectives of the practice route was to make the participant comfortable with the flight profile and monitor views, along with getting a solid grasp of using the confidence program. This route was paused roughly every 30 seconds for the participant to point out their perceived location on the map, and their confidence level. The participant were given some navigation assistance from the proctor if they were lost. Once the participant completed the route, they were asked if they were comfortable with the simulation and programs. They were allowed to have extra practice flying the helicopter if they were not comfortable.
After the completion of the practice route, the participant were tasked with completing four navigation routes where data was collected. In the first two routes, the participant were providing roll inputs while flying, whereas the last two routes were flown on autopilot. The first two routes began with a map study period of three minutes, in contrast the last two map study times were two minutes. Map study times were limited to provide increased difficulty by limiting the amount of headings and timings on the route, and to keep the experiment under an hour in duration. The last two map study times were less because the routes were shorter, and the helicopter was on autonavigation, reducing the task load on the participant. Before executing the auto-navigation route, the participants were also given a scenario. In this scenario, the participant simulates flying with a new pilot in the squadron who is responsible for the navigating and flying. Both the new pilot and the participant must fly in an area where they have never been. The new pilot is supposed to follow the route, but there is a chance that they can get off-track. The scenario informs the participant that the intended route is not necessarily what the new pilot will fly. Once the map study was complete, the participant conducted the navigation portion of the simulation. During the first two simulations, the route was paused about every 40 seconds. 40 seconds was not a hard number because the evaluator wanted to minimize pausing during turns. Pausing during turns can be disorienting to participants, and it is hard to remember the amount of bank they had after they finished the pause. During the second two simulations, the pause points were in the same location for each participant, and happened between 20-40 seconds. Again, these pauses occurred during level flight. After the completion of each of the navigation routes, the participants were given a post task questionnaire. It questioned whether the participant felt they strayed off-course, misperceived terrain, and asked what they could have done differently to remain on-course.
Once all four routes were completed, the participants were given one final questionnaire. This questionnaire covered topics on why they believe pilots get lost, what they do if they sense they are not on-course, and what they think their confidence level during navigation is. This questionnaire allowed for participant grouping based off similar responses. The participants were asked to add any additional comments, and the evaluator asked other pertinent questions to give insights on why they misperceived terrain on the route and confidence levels.
E. Statistical analysis and variable definition
We used Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ) to determine statistical dependence between variables for the first two hypothesis tests. Paired t-test or two-sample t-test were used when appropriate. The significance level, α, was set at 0.05. Demographic variables were collected from the background questionnaire that included TFH, overland flight hours, participation in similar past experiments, and experience with low-level and desert low-level navigation.
There were two major dependent variables used for analysis; 1) confidence and 2) the distance from the actual helicopter position to the perceived position. Pilots' confidence was self-reported using the Confidence App, i.e., participants rated their navigation confidence from 0 to 1 for each pause point. The CONF is defined as confidence measurement between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates the lowest confidence and 1 the highest confidence. CONF_BIN is a variation of CONF coerced into a binary variable. The CONF_BIN is defined "high" if CONF ≥ 0.5 and "low" otherwise. The threshold of 0.5 was chosen for the CONF_BIN variable because it was the numerical midpoint of the CONF range. This midpoint was easily defined on the Confidence App, making it a likely division between high confidence and low confidence. If a participant believed there was a good chance their perceived location is not close to the actual location they would not choose a confidence level over 0.5.
The error in perceived location was derived from the great circle distance 8 between the actual latitude and longitude position of the aircraft and the participant's perceived latitude and longitude:
-
where ERROR1 = great circle distance between perceived and actual location (km), R = Earth's radius at the Twentynine Palms, CA area = 6372.8 km, φ a = Latitude of the actual aircraft position in radians, φ p = Latitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians, χ a = Longitude of the actual aircraft position in radians, and χ p = Longitude of the perceived aircraft position in radians.
Similarly, the second type of error that was calculated was the distance between where the participant perceived they were compared to the intended route of flight: -
where ERROR2 = great circle distance between perceived and planned (intended) location (km), φ i = Latitude of the planned (intended) aircraft position in radians, and χ i = Longitude of the panned (intended) aircraft position in radians.
The NAV is a variation of ERROR1 coerced into a binary variable, indicating whether the participant stayed within a certain threshold/boundary. Pilots were instructed to stay within .5 km of the route; we buffered this to be .75 km. The NAV is defined "On-track" if ERROR1 < 0.75 km and "Off-track" otherwise. The 0.75 km distance for obtaining the NAV variable was used because participants were told prior to their navigation tasks that they should be confident in their perceived location if they were within 0.5km of their actual location. The 0.75 km gave the subjects an additional 0.25 km error distance because it is difficult for pilots to recognize if they fell within the 0.5 km distance exactly while navigating. This additional error distance also helped to affirm, without any doubt, that the participant had the wrong perception of their location.
IV. Experimental Results
A. Comprehensive navigation performance
The comprehensive analysis of the data related the experiment output to the Ref. 4 's modified SDT matrix for assessing navigation skills. Table 2 . shows experimental data of the confidence versus navigational error using the CONF_BIN and NAV variables. Table 2 shows that 58.3% of the time during the navigation participants were On-track and had a corresponding high confidence level. This table also shows that only 7.0% of time pilots had low confidence yet still were considered On-track. These percentages reflect that the subject was highly unlikely to misperceive their location when on-track, but the problem arose when the participants were Off-track. Subjects were off-track, yet still highly confident 27.0% of the time during the navigation. This indicates subjects were highly confident about their navigation performance 77.9% of the time when they were off-track. The misperception error is about 3.5 times greater than correct perception when a pilot is off track. This relates to the dangerous section of the matrix where pilots are lost and do not know it, and this is the second largest navigational state of the experiment among four navigational states. It is also in this area where mission failure and mishaps occur due to incorrect navigation. Table 3 shows that the confidence and correctness for each route align with the overall breakout. The most interesting fact that Table 3 shows is that the auto navigation routes (3 and 4) had a lower percentage of route correctness, 73.5% and 71.7% for routes 1 and 2 versus 64.4% and 65.2% for routes 3 and 4 respectively. The participants misperceive their location more frequently when control inputs were not required from them. Some explanations for this could be due to complacency, and/or experiment fatigue. During the auto navigation routes, participants seemed to be more relaxed during the navigation and map study. Participants were less likely to be actively tracking the course, which lead them to believe that the aircraft was heading on course. This type of complacency is common in multi-piloted aircraft and can be attributed to mishaps. Also noteworthy is the fact that route 3 had the highest percentage of time in the "dangerous" quadrant. Order effects may explain why route 3 was higher than the other routes. The "dangerous" quadrant of route 3 could be higher than that of route 1 and 2 because route 3 was the first time the participant dealt with auto-navigation. Additionally, route 3 could also be higher than route 4 because they pilot realized at the end of route 3 that the auto-navigation did not follow the intended route of flight, making the CONF on route 4 less than 3. This would correspond to a lower amount of time in the "dangerous" quadrant. The auto-navigation segments are important because they represent the situation of a junior pilot flying a route with an experienced, senior (and presumably, better) navigator. B. Hypothesis testing Hypothesis 1: We fail to reject the first null hypothesis, i.e., confidence and distance from particiapant's perceived location to actual helicopter position are not correlated for all 4 routes. Note that failing to reject the null hypothesis 1 is compatibile with what we observed from the previous experiment. Failing to reject the null hypothesis for this case could be a causal factor for pilots getting off-track, along with the associated mishaps and mission failures.
Hypothesis 2: We can reject the second null hypothesis, i.e., confidence and distance from participant's perceived location to intended route of flight are correlated for route1 (ρ = -0.65, p<0.05) and route 4 (ρ = -0.60, p<0.05). This means that the participant has high confidence when they believe they are close to the intended route for routes 1 and 4 regardless of their actual closeness. This result shows that there is evidence of biased visual perception favoring their intended location.
Hypothesis 3: There is a statistically significant difference in ERROR1 at the beginning of the route and ERROR1 at the end of the route for all four routes (t(14) =-2.067, p<0.05; t(14) =-3.150, p<0.005; t(14) =-7.708, p<0.001; t(14) =-2.816, p<0.01) . This suggests that the longer the participant flies, their perception error increases. This result can help pilots realize that they might want to reevaluate their perceived location the further along the route they are, and reduce their corresponding confidence in their location.
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant difference in CONF at the beginning of the route and CONF at the end of the route for all four routes (t(14) =3.105, p<0.005; t(14) =2.401, p<0.05; t(14) =2.310, p<0.05; t(14) =2.902, p<0.005) . This suggest that the longer the participant navigates along a route, their corresponding confidence becomes lower. This result follows along with hypothesis 3, that the perceived error appears to increase the longer the participant navigates. Pilots CONF is reducing with an increasing ERROR1. Although there is no correlation between CONF and ERROR1, there is a trending effect of CONF getting lower further into the route while ERROR1 is increasing.
V. Discussion
Analysis showed that there exists no correlation between perceived and actual location of the aircraft, nor between confidence level and actual location. There is however some evidence that there is a negative correlation between perceived location and intended route of flight, suggesting that there is a bias towards that intended flight route. Fig. 3 shows three types of errors that can be defined in the corresponding navigation scenario. ERRORpa = ERROR1 as defined in Eq. (1), ERRORpi = ERROR2 as defined in Eq. (2) and ERRORai is a distance between actual and intended location. We ran post-hoc analysis on a correlation between pilot confidence and ERRORai, which did not show a statistical significance as between ERROR1 and pilot perception. This result again supported that pilot confidence is not correlated with actual and perceived performance of pilot. Fig. 4 We can confirm the bias on the navigation map showing all three locations, i.e., the helicopter's actual trajectory, pilots' perceived location, and intended route. Fig. 5 shows representative misperception that fifteen pilots Ref. 6 presents a preliminary model of pilot visual misperception using a Bayesian framework as shown in Table  4 . Bayes' law relates the conditional probability and the marginal probabilities of what the pilot observes OTW and the actual position of the aircraft. This paper provides a follow-up experiments for supporting the observed misperception and the Bayesian framework. Pilots were grouped into Expert (= TFH>1000 hrs) and Novice (= TFH<1000 hrs) to examine the expertise effect on CONF, ERROR1, and ERROR2. The experiment included 11 Expert and 4 Novice participants according to the threshold 1000 hrs. Student t tests between Expert and Novice groups were conducted for each route, and no statistical significance was found. This result is surprising, and can again be helpful for crew coordination purposes. Although a pilot may have a lot of flight hours, it does not mean that their perception is better than Novice pilots. We note that while many of the pilots considered themselves expert, none were 'current' in the sense that the minimum time since last flight was six months.
We also examined if there is any correlation between pilots who have experience with low-level desert navigation and those who have very little to none. There were 7 partcipants who had low-level desert navigation experience and 8 who did not. The Student t-test revealed a statistical significance (t(7) =2.675, p<0.05) in Route 1 on ERROR 2 only. The result showed that pilots who were less familiar with the task tend to have more bias toward the intended route. However, we were not able to find the statistical significane in the other routes, and expertise effects should be examined further.
This experiment had three participants who had previously conducted a similar experiment. These participants could have a learning effect because they had already seen a similar OTW view and controlled a simulated aircraft. These participants had seen a route in Ref. 4 , so they could have an advantage over other participants during the two auto-navigation routes that were based off the route. Analysis was conducted to see if these three participants skewed the data. We found no learning effect in the participants.
Scenario (route) differences: there was statistically significantly different CONF between some of the routes. The difference in CONF is not too surprising, because the routes were set up to have varying difficulties. Route 1 was supposed to be harder than route 2, causing the CONF to be lower in route 2 than route 1. With a harder route, there are more chances for the participant to get off-track, thereby reducing their CONF level. Route 3 and 4 were set up to be similar, but there is a large difference in the data. The participants' realization at the end of route 3 that the autopilot did not follow the intended route may have caused the difference. This realization may havecaused the participant to be less confident in the location of route 4. The data shows that there was not a trending effect of increased or reduced confidence throughout the experiment. Regarding ERROR1 and ERROR2, there were no scenario differences found.
Power analysis was conducted for the significant correlation coefficients for routes 1 and 4 of hypothesis 2. The power ranges between .78 and .86 given a sample size = 15, α = .05, and observed ρ= .60 ~.65. This power is high considering the small sample size of the experiment, meaning that pilot bias toward the intended route is likely 9 . At the completion of the navigation and debriefing portion of the experiment, the participants were given a Post Task Questionnaire. This questionnaire was written to answer two questions. The first was to obtain navigation techniques that the more successful pilots used, while the latter was an attempt to normalize CONF levels. In the attempt to normalize the CONF levels, some interesting outcomes arose. The first being that only one participant felt that pilots were not over reliant on navigation equipment like GPS, with six neutral responses and eight positive. The second result of the questionnaire is that 12 of the 15 participants thought that it was easy to misinterpret terrain during overland navigation, with the other three responses being neutral. The last questionnaire output was the most interesting. Only two participants (13.3%) believed that they were overconfident in their navigation skills. This is surprising considering the percentage of time the participants were in the "dangerous" quadrant of flight. When the participant was Off-track, they had a high confidence, or wrong perception. This suggests that pilots are misperceiving their overconfidence during navigation.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated a methodology for determining the relationship between pilot perception and performance, and conducted an initial study. As helicopter missions, both civil and military, are frequently held at low altitude over varying terrain the importance of visual navigation, even augmented by GPS and other systems, will not be diminished in the near-term. Military aircraft frequently fly over rugged terrain to find targets (or survivors). Civil aircraft, such as "Life Flight" helicopters rely on visual navigation to find and recover their patients.
In our initial exercise of the model, we find that there is no significant relationship between a pliot's confidence and accuracy in navigation. Suprisingly, we find that there is also no significant relationship between a pilot's experience and the accuracy of his navigational self-assessment.
It is the second finding that we have the most interest in, and our immediate recommendation across rotary-wing aviation is to include syllabus events for both initial and refresher pilots where they test their navigation skills in a simulator, and then are shown the correctness of their route. This would serve to demonstrate to pilots that their self-assessments may not be accurate, with the intended goal of making their assessments more conservative. It would also demonstrate to Leadership that the problem of confidence vs. correctness in navigation is not just a 'nugget' (junior pilot) problem, but is prevelant across all ranks.
In this regard, the syallabus event we propose is similar to decompression chamber training, where pilots are asked to perform a cognitive task such as simple addition while experiencing mild hypoxia. The goal of our proposed event is the same as chamber training -to prove to the pilots in question that yes, navigation errors can happen to them.
Our experiment was conducted with a lone pilot given the single task of navigating in an overland environment with control over only the aircraft's heading. As such, it was impossible to crash the simulatior. In future experiments, we propose to give the subjects control over all three axes of flight, as well as perhaps incorporating mission elements such as radio traffic or specified 'time on target'. Finally, it would be informative and important to see how a crew of subjects, consisting of PAC, PNAC as well as crewmembers would perform, specifically with the research question of what mix of experience levels results in the best performance.
These next steps are currently being developed in our own laboratory, but a much better solution will be to form a partnership with military and civil training centers who have full-motion simulators. Direct implementation of the results from this experiment to new procedures and technologies is difficult because it involves personal confidence. The most important result from the experiment is that there needs to be training on this subject to give pilots the ability to recognize that confidence does not correspond to correctness during navigation. A single simulator event, possibly conducted in conjunction could be implemented into the Naval Aviation Enterprise; we feel that the most appropriate place would be the Fleet Reserve Squadrons (FRS) along with the corresponding Army and Air Force helicopter training schools, based on the finding of this experiment. Results from this experiment could also be added to aviation physiology and safety center documents.
Results from this experiment also suggest that helicopter navigation equipment is important for correct navigation performance. Any improvements in navigation equipment technology, that would reduce the reliance on visual navigation, would relate to less mishaps and mission failures. Current fleet navigation equipment requires large amount of pilot input. Reducing the pilot input requirements can allow the PNAC to better execute other duties in the cockpit.
Currently GPS is considered a supplemental navigation devise, and it is not required to execute overland lowlevel navigation. This experiment suggests that is not uncommon for pilots to misperceive their location just using visual navigation; the amount to which this is alleviated by GPS is an area for future research.
To enhance the results of this experiment a larger sample size spanning different experience, to include 'currency' and communities could be used. The larger sample size would allow for a better experience grouping of participants (expert, intermediate, and novice). Being able to effectively group the participants could provide insights into "overconfident" or "dangerous" population. This could pinpoint where dedicated time and technology needs to be spent. The experiment could also be conducted under realistic operation environments. These environments could be nighttime, emergencies, and different weather conditions. Again this would enhance the data for real world operations.The last future work is to combine model data to pilots as they are flying in a training simulator. This would be a real-time interactive training system that would notify pilots about the dangers and occurrence of misperception. This training would help reduce the amount of misperception during operational navigation. 
